twpatry wrote:
[quote
Thus, feel free to reject my previous definition as "an urge to destroy" but please do not throw out the idea that anger can happen without frustration.
[/quote]
Both anger and frustration are emotions caused by not getting what one wants. Anger of course is more intense which is why I define it as extreme frustration. Sure, anger can happen without frustration but if one quenches their anger then what results is frustration.

This is all part of the contentment emotions:
Enjoyment - having what you want (having what gives you contentment)
Grief - not having what you want
Frustration - not getting what you want
Anger - excessive Frustration
Distress - having what you don't want
Relief - not having what you don't want

A problem I had was how to define the difference between distress and frustration. I believe I got it true.

What I can't figure out though is how to prove it. It seems to me that saying a relation is a combination of subjects is provable by definition, thus establishing a framework for a true philosophy, but why has something so simple never been written? Pertaining to your post about social science, what else could there be to possibly work with?

twpatry wrote:
Example:
"I saw someone punch a baby in the face and it made me angry so I broke his jaw."

This statement could be rewritten as, "I saw someone punch a baby in the face and it made me so extremely frustrated with his integrity that I broke his jaw."

Of course I admit I could be contorting your example simply to justify my position about the definition of anger. Consider this though, with "urge to destroy," urge and destroy aren't emotions. The whole point about emotion theory is to show how the emotions are related together (if one consider them as subjects). Also, there are situations when the urge to destroy isn't associated with anger. For example, sometimes there is the urge to destroy for pleasure. Such a situation could be explained by leverage happiness or sensation which is an example of what I call secondary happiness. For example, I like to destroy bubble wrap but not out of anger. Right now I am having the view that an urge to destroy may sometimes be caused by anger but anger isn't caused by the urge to destroy. I still believe anger is caused by not getting what one wants.

twpatry wrote:
You say anger is: Extreme frustration

This seems problematic to me for two reasons:

First is that there are times where anger exists without frustration.

Second, I think there is a much better definition of anger:

Anger is the urge to destroy.

In my opinion, anger is an appropriate response to injustice motivates those who experience anger to destroy the cause of injustice (leading to a healthier society and, from an evolutionary standpoint, better odds of survival.)

Furthermore, in my opinion anger is an inappropriate response to frustration which motivates those who experience anger to destroy that which keeps them from getting what they want. Often, this leads to self destruction and antisocial behavior.
I appreciate this response. However, as one goes through life whenever the word anger is applied the word frustration can always be substituted in its place. You claim that there are times when anger exists without frustration but I disagree. You'll need to provide a sentence that uses the word anger where frustration would not fit in its place in order to convince me. If you can do that then I'll change it.

I believe the phrase "urge to destroy" is more closely aligned with hate than it is with anger. I assume you'll agree with me that hate is the opposite of love. Although I have the definition of love as extreme empathy, someone almost convinced me to change it to "desire to support." I declined to do so because there are times when someone can love but have no intention of improving, I believe. However, I almost did it. I still like "desire to support" as a definition of love but I like extreme empathy better. The point here is that "urge to destroy" is the opposite of "desire to support". If hate is the opposite of love then "urge to destroy" would then be a close definition of hate, not anger.

p.s. I looked at the website in your footer and I'd like to submit the definition for dimensions as "different ways of measuring." As measuring is a relation, dimensions would therefore also be "different ways of relating." Lately this has been important to me. I've decided to name the first section of Subjects and Relations theory, "dimension."

Dionysus wrote:

But how can we decide which sorts of combination have been exhausted/explained and which haven't, when the concept of a "second combination" admittedly doesn't involve any combining? I know you said that it is a form of combination, but an actual combining doesn't seem like it factors into the processes of continuity that you mentioned. In these terms it is really more like the word "combination" refers to the process by which processes may occur at all. In other words, what makes it possible to qualify relations with a a "second combination" and grow/increase the domain of functions for the word "combination" is some process of combining whose meaning can only be understood by being aware of the process of metaphysical theorizing as an increasing relationship between the chosen abstractions (in words) of the theorist and the functions that these words assume. So then a word like "combination" means different things according to what it is describing, rather than different descriptions allowing us to identify whether there has been a combination or not.
Let me put it this way, when a relation is being created it doesn't exist yet. The extrinsic subject, the subject that will describe the relation, won't exist until after the relation is created. This is what I call a primary combination. After the relation exists, combining other subjects to it does not change the extrinsic subject. This difference is why I call this type of combination a secondary combination. In a primary combination, comparison and leverage is not possible yet. Comparison and leverage is only possible if the extrinsic subject already exists. It doesn't matter what it is describing. Don't you believe this distinction is necessary?

As for processes, a process is simply a relation in time. The subjects are related temporally. In this case, more and less are referred to as before and after.


Dionysus wrote:

I actually don't agree with you here at all. Turning anything into a series of discrete events involves reference to concrete time, which should involve citing a relative observer or participant in time. An intellectual abstraction is made in order to say that a process is composed of this and this event occuring in such an order and with temporal bounds. In a friendship, there may be events which can be "scissored out" out of continuous becoming and cited as responsible for the increase of another abstraction - this is all cognitive, and to speak of discrete physics, discrete events, is to subsume description within the cognition of an observing subject.
Well, when we say a friendship got better, better is a relative term. To get better is an action which involves a reference in time. If you say a friendship is good or not then time isn't a factor, it isn't an action. My reply was in response to your question, "What is combining to make us better friends, and how is it combining?" This question seemed to me as an action.

Dionysus wrote:
My question is this: if the first combination between two subjects yields an extrinsic subject, but the second combination doesn't but involves an increase in relation, does it make sense to classify the second form of relations as a combination? It might be easier to put this into simple applicable terms.
Yes, combining to create a relation or combining with an existing relation are both examples of combining (obviously). It is very important to make this distinction though. Primary combination consists of start/stop, on/off, in/out, whatever creates a thread/process/relation. Secondary combination consists of more/less, grow/reduce, higher/lower, whatever continues a thread/process/relation. The third type of combination, back/forth, does not apply to either so it is its own type. There are no other types of combination possible. If you think of any let me know and I'll try to adjust this theory accordingly.


Dionysus wrote:
For example, if I'm understanding your theory right, if we were to combine with respect to an extrinsic subject, friendship, we would then be friends in the spirit of the first type of combination. If we then spent some time together and became "more" friends than before, this would be in the spirit of the second type of combination. So my question is simply - does the second combination, so classified, actually involve any combining? What is combining to make us better friends, and how is it combining?
Yes, becoming closer friends is a form of combining. Although this may seem like a continuous action, as with physics there is no such thing as continuous. What may seem to be continuous is actually a series of discrete events. It is something like a line is actually a collection of points. So, in the example of becoming closer friends, there are events that occur that add (combine with, grow more...) to an existing friendship. One more point here, we must remember that a friendship isn't physical, it is cognitive.


Dionysus wrote:
I like this theory because it reminds me of Spinoza. I'm wondering if we can't try to flesh it out using individualized components (like a person or people).
I'm a big fan of Spinoza. Although he is most remembered for his book called, "Ethics," which is actually about emotion theory, I admire him for his book called, "A Theologico-Political Treatise." It took a lot of guts for him to write that book.

Subjects and relations are abstract concepts. They don't actually exist in nature. This is something like circles and squares are abstract concepts too. If you want a circle or square you have to draw one yourself they don't exist in nature. We can't design things without them. Similarly, we can't flesh out subjects and relations theory in terms of specific subjects but we can't do philosophy without them. This is why to understand the difference between primary combination and secondary combination is so important. It is abstract.

leonardomenderes wrote:
From a great distance, focusing on relations
and differences could be a way forward for areas
like Science, to deal with the complexity that
is blunting biotech, etc..
When they specialize and focus in each object,
they cannot see the importance of context.
...and the importance of feedback.

As this theory isn't based on objects, it isn't applicable to the natural sciences. However, it is not relations and differences that is important here, I believe, but combination and separation. There is a difference between combining to create a relation (1stC) and combining to increase a relation (2ndC). This is more important than it sounds. When a relation is created an extrinsic subject is formed, when a relation is increased an extrinsic subject is not formed. It already existed. What I am going to say next is way 'out there' but I'm going to do it anyway. From this reference dynamic non-physical reality can be related to physical reality in this way:

1stC Extrinsic - Gravity
1stC Intrinsic - Charge
2ndC - Transmutation
Leverage - Light
Contentment - Inertia
3rdC - Heat

and thus the universe makes sense. There are no other types of combination and separation possible.

leonardomenderes wrote:
Meanwhile, a more compact form of your theory
with real examples would probably be easier to
fish with. It doesn't quite fit here because of the
stringent walls in western academic Philosophy.
Many people who "think about thinking" in general
fall outside it, but you can find them.
The work from other disciplines instead.
J.V.Smyth("The Habit of Lying) is from Lit., Rene Girard
(sacrifice and imitation) is from religious philosophy, etc..
The problem with real examples is that one can't isolate a particular question or problem individually. If I made an empirical point about something, the reason could be influenced by a myriad of effects thus making the empirical point meaningless. What I can do though is rationalize.

leonardomenderes wrote:
It looks more like a psychological theory-set than a metaphysical theory.
Thanks very much for this assessment.
I believe it to be a metaphysical theory (worldview) for the reason that the terms 'subject' and 'relation' are the most abstract of all terms (have the highest scope).

leonardomenderes wrote:
I'd try to cut down the dictionary, invent some theory-specific terms
instead, and focus on the core to prove it.
Proving that a relation is composed of subjects (the core) is not much different than proving a whole is composed of parts or many is composed of ones. It is supposed to be simple yet I can't find it in academic philosophy.

leonardomenderes wrote:
And find a psychological home.
Or focus strictly on aperception and Epistemics so you have a foot
in Philosophy.
I am not affiliated with any academic institutions. I would have to have help with that.

Jellophone wrote:
I see a graph and an explanation, but it isn't really a complete theory, is it? However, this should be good enough for a topic anyway.
[/quote]
No, it isn't technically a theory. A theory is a possible reason why an event occurs. I use the term theory loosely only because it is a common word. I think of the subject of subjects and relations more as a worldview.

Relations can be composed of units, objects or subjects. The relations of units is mathematics. The relations of objects is engineering. The relations of subjects is a worldview. This is a problem that goes back to the middle ages:

plato.stanford.edu/entries/relations-medieval
www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/z3609.html

Long before I knew about those ideas, I came up with the following metaphysical theory. It is based on sandwiching the concepts of combination and separation between subjects and relations. From that kernel here is what I have come up with. Although it looks like just another emotion theory some of the elements in it are not emotions. I believe it is the system we are in and it fills a huge hole in academic philosophy. I'd like to know what you think of it.



Some of these items are not in the diagram, not everything can be drawn.

Subject - a cross-utilized unit of a relation
Relation - more than one subject combined together
Extrinsic Subject - subject given to a relation
Intrinsic Subject - subject contained in a relation
Right - if a subject is within an extrinsic subject
Wrong - if a subject is not within an extrinsic subject
Possession - if an intrinsic subject is within a subject
Good - what increases a relation
Bad - what hinders or decreases a relation
Horror - excessive Bad
Serious - being within an extrinsic subject, also known as relevant
Silly - happiness that is not within an extrinsic subject
Crazy - if an extrinsic subject is ambiguous
Confusion - if the choice of an extrinsic subject is ambiguous
Value - direction of a relation
Like - to share Values


Happiness - occurs if subjects combine and form a relation. There are five different types of happiness. In order to include non-social relations in these definitions, the generic term combination is used symbolized with the letter 'C'.

1stC - occurs when subjects combine and a relation is formed. Here the extrinsic subject is created. The terms 'more' and 'less' do not apply with 1stC. It is very important to clarify that with 1stC one does not say, "Happiness is the combination of subjects," but, "Happiness occurs if subjects combine and form a relation."

2ndC - occurs when subjects are combined to an existing relation. Here the extrinsic subject already exists. The terms 'more' and 'less' apply with 2ndC. Leverage and contentment exist because of 2ndC.

3rdC - occurs as the back and forth dynamics between relations. Here more than one extrinsic subject is involved.

Leverage - resembles a lever, the relative lowering of a subject in a relation causes the relative increase of the other related subjects. This also is known as antipathetic happiness. Subjects on opposite sides of the lever are antipathetic to each other. An examples of this is kidding.

Contentment - is a relative position a subject has in a relationship. This position is what we mean when we say we are "happy". Another term that applies here is "fashion". Fashion is the active form of contentment. This type of happiness is personal and can be stronger than 1stC. Some sub-emotions of contentment are:


Enjoyment - having what you want (having what gives you contentment) *
Grief - not having what you want *
Frustration - not getting what you want
Anger - extreme Frustration
Distress - having what you don't want*
Relief - not having what you don't want*

Unhappiness is, of course, the converse but with separation instead of combination.

Sorry - empathetic Unhappiness
Regret - the action toward Sorry
Gratitude - the action toward antipathetic Happiness
Forgive - declaring Unhappiness to be irrelevant
Blame - declaring Unhappiness to be relevant
Nervous - anticipation of a combination
Shy - extreme Nervousness
Worry - anticipation of a separation
Concern - mild Worry
Fear - extreme Worry
Terror - extreme Fear
Anxiety - general term for Nervous, Shy, Worry, Concern, Fear or Terror

Pride - above Contentment
Shame - below Contentment
Dignity - empathetic Pride
Arrogance, Conceit - extreme Dignity
Honor - the action toward Dignity
Jealousy - antipathetic Pride
Envy - the action toward Jealousy
Respect - antipathetic Pride related to Fashion
Admiration - the action toward Respect
Modesty - empathetic Shame
Humility - the action toward Modesty
Pity - antipathetic Shame
Contempt - extreme Pity
Disgust - the action toward Pity

Expectation - future Contentment
Hope - the action toward Expectation (to want a future Contentment)
Standard - past Contentment
Surprise - empathetically or antipathetically above Standard or Expectation
Embarrassment - empathetically below Standard or Expectation
Disappointment - antipathetically below Standard or Expectation
Ecstatic - extreme Surprise
Sadness - extreme Disappointment or Embarrassment
Hate - extreme antipathy
Love - extreme empathy
Miss - absent empathy

Axiom: Extrinsic subjects can never be related intrinsic subjects. Such an event would instantly cause a new extrinsic subject to exist. This is called "The League Rule" or "The Authority Rule."

Axiom: Related subjects do not combine for the same reason that unrelated subjects do not separate. This is called "The Base Rule". It is a significant factor in physical morality.


*The definitions for Enjoyment, Grief, Distress and Relief are from I. Roseman 1984. Cognitive determinants of emotion: a structured theory. In P. Shaver (ed.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 5: Emotions, relationships, and health). Beverly-Hills: Sage, 11-36.

Note: In another forum someone insisted that the word 'extreme' should be used in place of 'excessive' for this definition of love. He felt that 'excessive' meant "too much" and was therefore a discontinuity. I reluctantly comply with his request.

Born2Snooze wrote:
Defining 'empathy' to mean the opposite of 'antipathy' is consistent with the meaning of the Greek word empátheia from which the English word 'empathy' originated (again according to dictionary.com.) However I think 'empathy' has come to have a different meaning than the Greek word from which it originated.
Yes, according to the definition that you provided 'empathy' can be used to share thoughts which are of course consistent with understanding. In this way, the definition of love as "extreme empathy" wouldn't be accurate. However, I can't think of a better word so I'm going to stick with it until I find one better.

I think that contrasting 'empathy' with 'antipathy' and 'apathy' helps to clarify love more closely than what I used to go with which was, "above the belt."

Born2Snooze wrote:
I'm not convinced that love is essentially an excess of empathy. To empathise with someone is to understand them to some extent. But who has not had the experience of loving someone without understanding them? You could say that if you love someone you should try to empathise with them, but empathy is not always possible even when love desires it.
I believe empathy is to be emotionally with or emotionally for as opposed to emotionally against which is antipathy or emotionally neutral which is apathy. Perhaps one might not understand someone who they are emotionally with, but lack of understanding does not mean emotionally against or emotionally neutral either. The word 'understanding' is usually assumed to be associated with empathy but, as you've pointed out, not always. I don't think love would be possible if the subject wasn't emotionally with or emotionally for. All of this depends on how one defines empathy.

Msafwan wrote:
What about love toward certain objects? (such as a car or a book?) Most people love inanimated stuff such as book and car because of the object's novelty, but they cannot empathize with such object because those object has no emotion. For example: lets say a car 'is-happy' to crash itself onto a wall (this is the car's emotion), but since the owner loved the car: he only kept the car in a garage, thus the car is 'sad'... (the owner can never know what the car wanted)

You are right, objects do not have emotions. Therefore, when one says a car 'is-happy' to crash itself into a wall, one is abusing the word 'happy.' The word love gets abused quite often as well. For example, "making love" is, I believe, an abuse of the word. Also, often times we use the word 'love' when we actually mean 'like.' Like and love are not the same thing. Like is to share values. Perhaps the owner of a car or book that he 'loves' in actuality 'likes' the car or book. He likes it so much that it is excessive like which can easily be substituted for excessive empathy or love.
Msafwan wrote:
No one loves a book or a car like that (no one tried to make a book happy). But people do preserve the object that they love by laminating those books or polishing the car (protecting its 'beauty'). This way they have demonstrated their love torward the 'beauty' of the object, and not torward the object's emotion (not empathy).

But I'm not saying that 'beauty' is absolute (example: not every lorry is beautiful). I'm just saying that people love things because it is 'beautiful' (subjective). Perhaps someone would love a hammer, a cat, a human being, or a weather, and a cat, or ect... (arbitrarily)
If someone loved an object, even though the object couldn't love back, the person would have empathy for the object. In other words, they'd be hurt if the object were to be damaged. Protection of an object out of love for it wouldn't be from the object's emotion. The object can't have empathy but the subject can.
Msafwan wrote:
IMO love is not "excessive empathy".
Ok, I just want to say that it takes a little getting used to. I never used to think a simple definition of love was possible. What worked for me was love was above the belt and lust was below. These days, for me, excessive empathy works better. Thinking of a proof for it helps as well.

The world has something to learn about love. In Subjects and Relations theory,

"Love is excessive empathy."

Here is the proof:
Given that,

• Apathy is lack of emotion.


• Empathy and antipathy are antonyms.


• Love and hate are antonyms.

If an emotional situation exists, one is either empathetic, apathetic or antipathetic. There are no other possibilities. Being that different degrees of empathy and antipathy must exist, excessive amounts of empathy and antipathy must exist as well. It is easy to display that excessive antipathy must be hate as hate occurs from an opponent in a competition. Opponents are antipathetic adversaries. If hate is excessive antipathy and love is the opposite of hate then love must be excessive empathy.

The world doesn't seem to know this. I have never seen it written. In the Wikipedia it says, "This diversity of uses and meanings, combined with the complexity of the feelings involved, makes love unusually difficult to consistently define, even compared to other emotional states."
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Love

Colorful ideas about love can be seen here in this Wisdom Commons page: www.wisdomcommons.org/virtues/84-love

Both references, and in the dictionaries I have looked at, never say, "Love is excessive empathy."
This is certainly not unusually difficult to consistently define.

- JHuber
www.subjectsandrelations.com

This seems like some kinda robot... I mean, this is what I posted at the start of one of my earlier threads.

Oh...thanks for the heads-up.

The theory of radical evil is that for a person to do something wrong, he or she has to first have decided in general, prior to any other action, that the first principles of right and wrong will not be the first principles of his or her life. This basic corruption, when coupled with particular occasions for deviation from moral standards, is the source of all concrete immoral action. Since morality is (according to the Standard Model of radical evil) a function of reason, and reasoning and thinking come to pretty much the same thing, that means that our general perversity comes from perverting our use of our ability to reason or think. (Note also the equation of freedom with thinking re: autonomy and the ethics of the categorical imperative.

Yes, well right and wrong are subjective terms. Being subjective terms, the same event could be right in one environment and wrong in another environment. Ultimately, our common viewpoint of right and wrong comes from our worldview. It is our worldview that sets the ultimate right and wrong. This is why we are at war. And, as you know, war is hell. But you see, the generic definitions of right and wrong comes from the subject of subjects and relations. This isn't contained in theism or atheism. I can't even find it in academic philosophy. The solution is so simple yet everyone seems to fight it with all of their might.