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In Being and Event, Badiou speaks about a subject-language that is formed within the truth-process outside of the "prevailing language and established knowledge of the situation." But what does a subject-language look like? I have considered two possibilities so far that I think are both wrong.
First, Badiou uses example statements to describe parts of his truth-process, e.g. fidelity to an event. He says, at this stage the subject claims, "I recognize this event and will be faithful to it." Doe this claim represent what he calls the subject-language? There are two options here: (1) it is the subject-language for all subjects in a fidelity, a universal subject-language, or (2) it is a metaphor for a particular subject-utterance like "I will be faithful to the October Revolution." (1) is wrong for obvious reasons. The second option is more puzzling, but the fidelity still seems to appropriate language that is part of the "established knowledge of the situation." What makes the same words a subject-language in this instance and not in another?
So, this track of thinking led me to Searle's equation X COUNTS AS Y IN C and the second possibility of a subject-language. Perhaps the statement "I will be faithful to this hot dog" can count as a subject-language in a truth-process and not as one in all other situations. This is a decent answer, but I don't think it passes Badiou's qualifications. Surely a subject-language must be a language outside of language. (Or maybe I just don't want to admit what Derrida says, that language is always of the other, but empirically it would seem that language is more than just appropriation.)
At any rate, it isn't clear what a subject-language looks like at all. What do you think?
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