I have been waning in between two poles recently. Before proceeding, let me define structures of experience as the collective aggregates of how phenomena reveal themselves independently of our presuppositions. Transcendental signifies only a conceptual description of human knowing universally, not otherworldly. The subject is a classic way to refer to the thinking mind.

First, there is the exploration of subjective structures of experience, or simply put how it is the world reveals itself to the knowing subject. The other is that phenomena cannot be reduced to the subject transcendentally; the structures of experience are interpreted from what we can say about structures of the world, focusing on language instead of the subject.

I stand between the meta-perspective, i.e. the transcendental subject, and the finitude of what our language states to others is only what we can talk about the structures of experience. This is an opposition between the universal and the contingent.

This is a tension situated philosophically between Husserl and Gadamer if you want to know. I dunno. Just thought I would throw it at you.

JKT

It is possible that I just didn't understand something because I seem to think that both positions here have taken a misstep. Please inform me if I have misunderstood either of these positions.

<b>On the first of the two views:</b> the subjective structures of experience seems to be a transcendental inquiry that may not afford much in terms of results (knowledge). When we are asking how it is that the world reveals itself to the subject we can only think of logical possibilities; because we do not have knowledge of the subject, we can't even begin to consider what it is that reveals the world to this subject.

There is a difference between the inquiry Kant made into the way the world is revealed (as phenomena), and in this inquiry which wonders the way the world is revealed to the subject (which is not found among phenomena). Kant's inquiry here deals with objects (in experience), while the other view deals with subject which are outside of experience. What knowledge do we have to start from to make progress in the later? (Being a logical subject we can have subjective knowledge of the subject, ie it can't be contradictory.)


<b>On the second view:</b> I am not sure what to use to distinguish between structures of the world and structures of experience (unless experience is objective and world is subjective, but this doesn't seem right here), but, at any rate, why is it that structures of experience are built from language, and not the other way around? It seems to me that language appropriates meaning as a result of it being understood in a certain way, and that the meaning of language is itself is revealed to us as phenomena.

When I say, "language appropriates meaning by being understood in a certain way", what I mean is that language is schematized, just like all other sensory input, and this is what will bring about its being understood as being meaningful. If this is the case then it would simply be an error to say that the structures of experience, which represent what allows phenomena to reveal themselves, are created from language, which is only understood when represented as phenomena. It seems to make more sense that our structures of experience are built upon things that don't require structures of experience to begin with.

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I could be misunderstanding the definition of structures of experience so allow me to express how I understood it as being described.

The structures of experience are collective aggregates of how phenomena reveal themselves. So a structure of experience is the result of <i>how</i> particular phenomena that make up this structure of experience are represented.

I consider language a structure of experience because it is the result of the manner in which certain phenomena are revealed (to be meaningful). A chair is a structure of experience because it presents itself as an object I can sit on, because that is how the phenomena is revealed (I feel it is presented this way because I don't need to make judgments that I can sit in chairs, I simply understand that and sit without consideration).

Ubertweed,

I just want to say how much I enjoyed your post.

There is a difference between the inquiry Kant made into the way the world is revealed (as phenomena), and in this inquiry which wonders the way the world is revealed to the subject (which is not found among phenomena). Kant's inquiry here deals with objects (in experience), while the other view deals with subject which are outside of experience. What knowledge do we have to start from to make progress in the later? (Being a logical subject we can have subjective knowledge of the subject, ie it can't be contradictory.)


This type of inquiry is found amongst phenomena. Rightly so, my question here is a tension between two thinkers in "phenomenology." These types of phenomenology are in-the-world I assure you. They are, as it were, found not outside of experience as Kant would call someone who claims knowledge beyond sensibility. Instead, phenomena are not interpreted before experiencing them. Phenomenology seeks out how it is that phenomena in the world reveal themselves to the knowing subject, that is, how things in the world are disclosed to us prior to any theoretical attitude we would impose on them.

It seems to me that language appropriates meaning as a result of it being understood in a certain way, and that the meaning of language is itself is revealed to us as phenomena.


Absolutely. There is a context to which meanings arise in the usage of language, and it is this history of interpretation, sough within language, that Gadamer takes ascentral to the question of how it is that phenomena are revealed. They are revealed in the histories and traditions of thought as they appear in language. As such, there is no cogito, no apperception which is the center of meaning, but meaning is historically conditioned through language and culture itself. This is very anti-subjective.

This is very insightful right here. This may be a way out of the two poles if pushed a little more and taken a certain way. You stated:

I consider language a structure of experience because it is the result of the manner in which certain phenomena are revealed (to be meaningful). A chair is a structure of experience because it presents itself as an object I can sit on, because that is how the phenomena is revealed (I feel it is presented this way because I don't need to make judgments that I can sit in chairs, I simply understand that and sit without consideration).

Equating language as a structure of experience may be an interesting way out. The forseeable problem is that language is used to convey things about the structures of experience. So if we assert that language conveys the very thing it itself is, then how is that we have knowledge of structures of experience?

I guess that may be the impasse that we would have to address.

JKT

Equating language as a structure of experience may be an interesting way out. The forseeable problem is that language is used to convey things about the structures of experience. So if we assert that language conveys the very thing it itself is, then how is that we have knowledge of structures of experience?


I think I was wrong to judge that language was a structure of experience. In my haste I forgot to make a finer distinction between meaning and language (:oops:). But after reading this I remembered that I have made this distinction in the past.

I would like to say that meaning, instead of language, is a structure of experience. This is because meaning is not derived from experience, but is part of the actual experience.

Now, we have a system of representing meaning to ourselves, but this system is not a structure of experience itself, and when we use reason to activate this system of representing meaning we do not find meaning referencing itself. Because this system (applied by our reason) is different from our structure of experience (applied by our understanding), our knowledge of meaning as a structure of experience is not harmed by our application of this system of representing meaning ( This seems to be the case at least).

I do think that this solution makes a great deal of sense. My largest curiosity is exactly how reason works in such a way that it knows what to have us represent to present certain meanings, and when it does this it seems that we already know what we are going to represent,so why do we need to represent it? It could be that we really don't know what we want to represent because reason acts spontaneously so that knowledge is beyond experience. It could be that we are built in such a way that we only get meaning from experience; meaning is only understandable as a structure of experience in this case.

There would seem to be an effect that experience has on our ability to reason. As we gain experience of meaning it enables our reason to make use of to represent meaning to ourselves maybe.

I edited this a lot after I posted, sorry about that <!-- editby --><br /><br /><em>edited by: Uber_tweed, Jul 27, 2006 - 10:31 AM</em><!-- end editby -->

[img]http://spinferno.com/images/forum/funny/bump.jpg" />

Hi,
I do think you're right in one way that Gadamer is anti subjective, at least in his criticism of kantian (or neo-kantian) aesthetics. However he certainly isn't exactly pro objectivity either, I think he explicitly rules out the idea that we will ever get to objective knowledge of the 'good' etc. Doesn't he use the metaphore of a horizon; we can see it, but we cant ever reach it. Of course one might say that when we see a horizon, we aren't realy seeing something that exists at all. Yet we do see it as something and interpret it in a certain way, because, Gadamer would suggest, our prejudices lead us to see it that way.
I've only just started reading Truth and Method, its not exactly an easy book, but he does talk about Husserll a fair amount, so it might be better to go back to what he says about him. If you're interested.


This is my first message, so if i completly missed the point of what you were saying, then... im sorry
haha